On Compelling the Affirmation of a Proposition

These days, there are plenty of cases of a person or organization compelling another person(s) to affirm a statement, say, for the sake of acquiring or keeping a job or membership. Such statements typically have moral, religious, or political content (or some content that is quasi-moral, etc.). I assume the reader can recall examples.

Now, these affirmations seem intrinsically worthless (if not a downright disvalue) if merely uttered but not believed. Why would one give lip service to the affirmation? Precisely because one is forced to do so in exchange for a job, membership, etc. Such utterances, then, might have instrumental value for the sake of some desirable end. Still, the utterances have no value in themselves – notwithstanding the pretense otherwise under which the compelling party operates. Insofar as they are compelled, the utterances are not free acts. Insofar as they are uttered, what really matters to the utterer is the job, membership, etc., and not the content of the utterance.*

Let’s call such cases compelled affirmations (CAs).

Suppose an affirmation is imposed upon some, but others accept it because they believe it and not because they are being forced to affirm it. Call this affirmation A. In this case, proposition p of A is believed by person S.

Consider: p is either true or not true. Suppose that p is the sort of proposition that can be affirmed or denied based on reasons both pertinent and available to S.  

We thus have the following options:

(1) S believes that p, and p is true, and S’s belief is based on adequate reason;

(2) S believes that p, and p is true, and S’s belief is not based on adequate reason;

(3) S believes that p, and p is not true, and S’s belief is based on adequate reason;

(4) S believes that p, and p is not true, and S’s belief is not based on adequate reason.

What is the objective value of each option?

I propose the following ranking:

(1), (3), (2), (4).

Why is (2) ranked third rather than second? Because, arguably, epistemic rationality has a higher value than truth obtained via luck. (2) is for S likely a matter of luck and hence not rationally justified. (Note: Gettier cases seem to show that sometimes a belief can be both rationally justified and lucky — depending on what is meant by “rationally justified.” I set such cases aside for now.) In other words, S believes that p but gets lucky that p is true. S has no good reason to believe that p and therefore is not warranted in doing so. (3), though false, is supported by adequate reason and thus justified even if false. (4) is the worst of the bunch since it has nothing worthwhile going for it. (Or does it? See below.) It is neither true nor reasonable. (1), on the other hand, is both true and reasonable, and consequently possesses both epistemic goods.

What about CAs? Perhaps CAs rank between (2) and (4). Why? Although intrinsically worthless, a CA might be instrumentally good for obtaining some worthwhile end and, therefore, practically rational and hence understandable in the sphere of action, even if epistemically undesirable and objectionable with respect to the demands of theoretical (i.e., philosophical) reason.

But wait! Can’t scenario (4) sometimes fit the same description? Suppose S is in scenario (4). S believes that p, but p is false and not supported by reason, and yet believing-that-p is a means for S to acquire some non-epistemic welfare good, such as psychological comfort. In this case, like CAs, (4) lacks intrinsic value but is useful for the sake of, say, tranquility.

Yet a problem arises. Is tranquility based on an unreasonable and false belief worth having? If (notice that I emphasize “if”!) ignorance is bliss, is the bliss worth having? Is it better to be irrational, deceived, and placid or to possess rationality and truth, and yet risk being unsettled by your true and rational belief?

It seems to me that the latter is better. Truth and rationality are worth having even at the expense of ataraxia. Ideally, one seeks all three. But if serenity must be sacrificed for the sake of sophia, then so be it — serenity be surrendered.

Why? I’ll try to provide a supporting argument in a later post. For now, other duties call.

*Addendum: Indeed, the speaker might not care whether or not what is said is true. Instead, the speaker cares only about obtaining what is offered in exchange for the speech act. In this case, the speaker might be guilty of what Frankfurt aptly called “bullshit.”